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 When the psycho-economic history of the years 1917 
to 1921 shall be written by one suffi ciently detached in 
time and sentiment, this sudden solicitude on the part of 
the ruling interests for the integrity of “American” ideals 
and viewpoints will doubtless be properly and fairly 
related to the fear of “radicalism” and the popular belief 
that “radicalism” and “foreign-language” are synonymous 
terms (Wolfe 1921a, p. 131). 
 Albeit concerned with the biological element in social evolution, Albert B. Wolfe 
was among the very few economists of the progressive era who openly expressed 
their concerns about certain implications of eugenic rhetoric for the social science. 
Specifi cally, Wolfe questioned the strong hereditary boundaries that more extreme 
eugenicists suggested about human beings. A careful examination of Wolfe’s writings 
reveals that his reaction was rooted in the belief that many of the social problems 
that eugenicists attributed to hereditary limitations were actually imputable to 
the infl uence that the social, economic, and physical environment exercised on the 
individuals. 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE 
 According to the received accounts, one of the distinguishing marks of the American 
Progressive era—the period of time from the second half of the 1890s to the early 
1920s—was the broad popular consensus on the role of government as the primary 
agent of social change. To that end, an entire generation of young crusaders in public 
service seized and wielded new powers, and enacted a stream of new legislation, 
regulating markets for goods, labor, and capital, thereby protecting the less fortunate 
segments of American society from the consequences of unrestrained  laissez-faire 
capitalism. Driving this activism was an almost unconditional faith in the role of science—
including the emerging social sciences—to identify the nation’s problems and imple-
ment wise plans to eliminate waste and ineffi ciency. Many interpreters have stressed 
the centrality of the ethical component in Progressive-era reformers’ fervor. Acting as 
advocates for education, settlement houses, prohibition, immigration restriction, birth 
control, and political reform, progressive intellectuals sought to create a more demo-
cratic society. “They denied the liberal contention”—James Kloppenberg (1986, p. 173) 
pointed out—“that the pursuit of personal interest insures optimal social benefi ts. 
The public interest, like the ethical ideal, emerges from the concrete struggle among 
competing conceptions of the good.” This ethical awareness was accompanied by 
an equally pervasive certainty that social progress requires government intervention. As 
Robert Prasch (1999, p. 223) has observed, “[a] unifying feature of Progressive era polit-
ical economy was the belief that direct government action could serve the economic and 
moral needs of American people.” Such contiguity between social science and reform was 
demonstrated by the fact that the American Social Science Association, formed after the 
Civil War, included both social reformers and social scientists (Ross  1991 , p. 63). 
 Despite the wide acceptance of this narrative, recent historiography has shown 
that there are substantial reasons to question whether it accurately portrays the actual 
motivations leading many of the Progressive-era reformers. In a path-breaking 2003 
article and in a series of other contributions, Thomas C. Leonard ( 2003 ,  2005a ,  2005b , 
 2009 ) has offered a completely new historical account of the sources of Progressive-era 
labor legislation and the intentions of its promoters. Leonard’s work indicates a signif-
icant role played by eugenic and “race improvement” ideas in the arguments made for 
policies such as minimum wages, restrictions on the hours of work of women, and 
restrictions on immigration. Specifi cally, Leonard ably documents that some of the 
leading economists of the time understood exactly that binding minimum wages would 
cause job losses. Nonetheless, they supported minimum-wage laws and other interven-
tions into the labor market precisely because they would weed out those inferior 
workers—in particular, women, immigrants, and blacks—who earned less than an ad-
equate standard of living and unfairly pushed down the wages of the more productive 
workers. Eugenics provided a “scientifi c” veneer for policies intended to promulgate 
racial, ethnic, or class prejudices. In this connection, Leonard writes, “the progressive 
economists … believed that the job loss induced by minimum wages was a social ben-
efi t, as it performed the eugenic service ridding the labor force of the ‘unemployable.’” 
Accordingly, he quotes Sydney and Beatrice Webb’s (1920, p. 785; quoted in Leonard 
 2003 , p. 699) statement that “this unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but 
actually of social health.” Further, he refers to Henry Rogers Seager (1913, p. 12; 
quoted in Leonard  2003 , p. 702) of Columbia University, who affi rmed that minimum 
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wages were necessary to protect workers from the “wearing competition of the casual 
worker and the drifter.” In addition to Seager and the Webbs, Leonard mentions leading 
economists, such as Francis A. Walker, William Z. Ripley, John R. Commons, Simon 
N. Patten, Thomas N. Carver, Irving Fisher, Frank Fetter, William Willcox, together 
with several others, as adopting eugenic ideas.  1  
 Interestingly enough, Leonard’s lengthy list of eugenics supporters also includes 
the name of Albert Benedict Wolfe.  2  Wolfe, who would serve as president of the 
American Economic Association in 1943, can be defi ned as an institutionalist with 
progressive roots. As observed by Leonard (forthcoming), the fi rst generation of 
American progressives was, in fact, born between the mid-1850s and 1870; while the 
public launch of institutionalism as a movement in American economics can be dated 
to 1918, when Walton H. Hamilton ( 1919 ) presented his famous institutionalist mani-
festo. Wolfe, who was born in 1876, just missed being of the original progressive 
generation, and was already forty-two in 1918. In the early 1920s, Wolfe became 
associated with the so-called “scientifi c wing” of American institutionalism (Rutherford 
 1999 ; Asso and Fiorito  2004 ). He contributed an essay to Rexford Tugwell’s  Trend of 
Economics (Wolfe  1924a ), and participated in several American Economic Association 
roundtables representing the institutionalist point of view (Wolfe  1924b ,  1926 ).  3  
 Wolfe enrollments among the ranks of eugenic enthusiasts is based on his support 
for the “eugenic virtues of disemployment” (Leonard  2003 , p. 703). Accordingly, in a 
passing comment, Leonard refers to the following passage from Wolfe’s participation 
in an American Economic Association roundtable on minimum wages:
 The general toning up of industry that would result from universal minimum wage 
legislation would be noteworthy. If the ineffi cient entrepreneurs would be eliminated 
so would the ineffective workers. I am not disposed to waste much sympathy upon 
either class. The elimination of the ineffi cient is in line with our traditional emphasis 
on free competition, and also with the spirit and trend of modern social economics. 
There is no panacea that can “save” the incompetents except at the expense of the 
normal people. They are a burden on society and on the producers wherever they are. 
(Wolfe  1917 , p. 278) 
 Wolfe’s endorsement of minimum-wage legislation and its eugenicist consequences 
is not in dispute here. In this regard, Leonard’s analysis is correct and pertinent.  4  Wolfe 
 
1
 Leonard’s list of eugenics supporters is quite heterogeneous and covers a broad range of American economics 
from conservative to progressive. Moreover, albeit all sympathetic to eugenics, these fi gures differed sub-
stantially in their views on the proper role and effi cacy of eugenic policies (Rutherford  2005 ). 
 
2
 Albert Benedict Wolfe (1876–1967) was born and reared in Illinois. He received his BA (1901) and PhD 
(1905) from Harvard. There he studied under Thomas Nixon Carver, who obtained for him a position of 
associate professor of economics and sociology at Oberlin College in 1905. From 1914 to 1923, he taught 
economics and sociology at the University of Texas, and then moved to Ohio State University as professor 
of economics. His doctoral dissertation,  The Lodging House Problem in Boston (Wolfe  1906 ), won a David 
Ames Wells Prize at Harvard. This brief biographical sketch draws upon Dorfman (1959, p. 567). 
 
3
 In the late 1920s, Wolfe’s interests shifted to demography and population studies (see, for instance, Wolfe 
1928a,  1928b ,  1929 ). 
 
4
 Wolfe was also a member, along with other academics such as Arthur N. Holcombe of Harvard, Herbert E. 
Mills of Vassar College, and Henry R. Seager, of a Special Committee on Minimum Wage Boards appointed 
by the National Consumers’ League as early as in 1909 (Skocpol  1995 , p. 405). 
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agreed with many of his progressive fellows that a minimum wage had the positive 
effect of sorting the unfi t, who would be expelled from the labor market, from the 
deserving workers, who would retain their jobs. There is one aspect, however, which 
I think deserves closer examination. Differently from most economists discussed by 
Leonard, he did not attach any racial, sexual, or classist connotation to the unfi t or 
undeserving worker. Moreover, albeit concerned with the biological element in social 
evolution, Wolfe was among the very few economists of the time who openly expressed 
their concerns about certain implications of eugenic rhetoric for the social science. 
Specifi cally, Wolfe questioned the strong hereditary boundaries that more extreme 
eugenicists suggested about human beings.  5  As I will attempt to show in this paper, a 
careful examination of Wolfe’s writings reveals that his reaction was rooted in the 
belief that many of the social problems that eugenicists attributed to hereditary limita-
tions were actually imputable to the infl uence that the social, economic, and physical 
environment exercised on the individuals. 
 The paper is organized as follows: the fi rst section presents Wolfe’s general views 
on eugenics; the second and third sections discuss Wolfe’s social psychology and 
its anti-eugenicist implications; the fourth section deals with Wolfe’s criticism of 
Raymond Pearl’s population growth theory; and the fi fth section presents some 
conclusions. 
 II.  WOLFE ON EUGENICS 
 Let me begin by pointing out that Wolfe showed a keen interest in eugenics since the 
early 1910s. This is confi rmed by the large number of works on the subject he reviewed 
in leading academic journals (see, for instance, Wolfe  1910 ,  1911a , 1911b, 1913). The 
common theme of these reviews was an explicit skepticism toward the objectivity of 
the arguments advanced by eugenics apologists. Wolfe consistently challenged what 
he perceived to be the limitations of eugenics as a science: inadequate attention to 
environmental factors in the shaping of human nature, and overstated allegations about 
the inherited roots of social problems. In reviewing Caleb W. Saleeby’s  Parenthood 
and Race Culture (1909), for instance, Wolfe complained about the author’s failure “to 
appreciate the initial diffi culty, in both theory and practice, of distinguishing in any 
individual or any stock the characters due to organic heredity and those due to family 
and social tradition, custom, education, etc. This one fact should make us wary of 
accepting the conclusions of writers … whose enthusiastic discipleship outruns their 
scientifi c reason” (Wolfe  1911a , p. 132). In a similar vein, Wolfe believed that the 
position held in  Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (1911) by Charles Davenport—head 
 
5
 Following Cooke ( 1998 ), by “extreme eugenicists,” I refer to fi gures such as Charles Davenport Harry H. 
Laughlin, Henry F. Osbom, Madison Grant, and Leon Cole, who emphasized the strictly (mostly 
Mendelian) hereditarian aspects of eugenics, denying that environmental changes could signifi cantly affect 
development. As noted by many interpreters, however, these views represented a harder edge of American 
eugenics—many more moderate eugenicists were willing to implement environmental reform measures 
and did not focus only on biologically inherited traits. This heterogeneous approach to eugenic reform, in 
part, refl ected the varied interpretations of the meaning of the word “heredity” in early twentieth-century 
America (Leonard  2003 ,  2005a ,  2005b ,  2009 ). 
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of the Eugenics Record Offi ce at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory—overemphasized 
Mendel, and this enthusiasm had led him to unduly neglect the role of “social 
heredity” in the transmission of individual attitudes and abilities. As Wolfe put it in the 
pages of the  American Economic Review :
 Seriously, we regret that Dr. Davenport did not wait a year or two before putting out 
this book. When a writer cites a family of yacht builders in which father, son, and grandson 
have designed and built cup-defenders, as a proof of the inheritance of specifi c 
mechanical ability, he has simply failed to think of the power of family interests and 
traditions, training, and above all of suggestion. No biologist should set his pen to eugenic 
paper until he has prayerfully brushed up his knowledge of modern genetic psychology 
and psychological sociology. He will then talk less glibly of the inheritance of specifi c 
mental abilities. By all means let us have all the light on heredity that scientifi c investi-
gation, amply endowed, can give us, but in our enthusiasm in following out a new line 
of discovery let us not neglect to view scientifi cally all the factors that determine the 
character of the individual in society. A practically contemptuous attitude toward 
environmental infl uence, an ignoring of the tremendous power of “social heredity” and 
especially of the power of seemingly trivial suggestion on the young developing mind, 
cannot but injure, in the long run, the cause of racial improvement which Dr. Davenport 
has with such devotion and ability set himself to stimulate. (Wolfe  1913b , p. 168) 
 Environmental infl uences act upon individuals, according to Wolfe, through the 
intellectual and physical stimuli resulting from active cooperation among human 
beings, and this considerably decreased the impact of heredity.  6  It would decrease it, 
but it would by no means eliminate it. It should be noted, in fact, that although Wolfe 
criticized eugenicists for their lack of adequate attention to environmental factors, he 
did not deny  in toto the infl uence of heredity in the transmission of human character-
istics. As a telling example, Wolfe praised Henry H. Goddard’s study into the inherit-
ability of intelligence. According to Wolfe:
 The Kallikak Family , by the director of the research laboratory of the Vineland (N.J.) 
Training School for Feeble-minded Girls and Boys, is a book of another type. What 
investigations such as those into the Jukes and Edwards families failed to do—segregate 
environmental and hereditary infl uences and demonstrate the heritability of mental 
defects—this monograph does, beyond possibility of reasonable doubt. Not only is 
the hereditary character of feeble-mindedness proved with practical conclusiveness, 
but its economic signifi cance is set forth calmly and sanely and with rare impressiveness. 
Every economist should read this book, whether he is interested in a dream of a future 
race, perfect in beauty and holiness, or not. (Wolfe  1913b , p. 169) 
 
6
 Wolfe rejected also any deterministic account of human attitudes based on gender difference. In reviewing 
 The Task of Social Hygiene by Havelock Ellis ( 1912 ), he observed that when the author “goes on to say that 
‘the really fundamental difference between man and woman is that he can usually give his best as a creator, 
and she as a lover, that his value is according to his work and hers according to her love,’ we think he simply 
lets his literary ability get away with his science (1913a, p. 397). Similarly, commenting upon Thomas 
Nixon Carver’s  The Religion Worth Having , Wolfe lamented: “[w]e are left with a feeling that the author 
would go with some of the popular eugenists of the day and make a woman a mere reproductive organism 
rather than an integral part of this race, the progress of which is still to entail so much confl ict and so much 
pain” (Wolfe  1912 , p. 681). 
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 Wolfe, thus, was mainly unsatisfi ed with the present status of eugenics as a scien-
tifi c discipline but he did not exclude aprioristically the possibility of a fruitful 
cross-fertilization between eugenics and the social sciences. This led him to launch a 
plea for a “more productive cooperation in the future between biologists, sociologists, 
and medical men,” and to concede that “in the general ideal of conserving human energy, 
which should be perhaps the economics ideal, the eugenics idea is so important, in 
promise, that economists cannot afford to ignore it” (Wolfe  1913b , p. 166). 
 Such an ambivalent attitude is confi rmed by Wolfe’s decision to include in his  Readings 
on Social Problems (Wolfe, ed. 1916) a whole section on eugenics consisting of writ-
ings by Achille Loria, James A. Field, and Goddard. The section was preceded by 
some introductory remarks by Wolfe that deserve to be quoted in full length:
 Until recently the population problem has been discussed too much as if population 
were of unvarying potential quality, no matter how its quantity might change. If we are 
to regard the well-being of a whole people as the right aim of both individual and 
social endeavor, if we recognize that the material basis of this well-being lies in the 
power of men, within the limits set by natural laws, to utilize natural forces and mate-
rials in the most effi cient and economical way, and if the psychical content of life 
derived from this material basis depends upon the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic 
sensitiveness of individual men and women, then it must be evident at once that a 
scientifi c study of the economy and effi ciency of a population, in the largest sense, 
must include not only a study of the quantitative relation between a people and its 
natural resources, but a careful consideration also of the physical and mental qualities 
of the individuals, the families, and the stocks which compose the aggregate popula-
tion. (Wolfe, ed. 1916, 135) 
 This passage reveals the essence of Wolfe’s position, and its importance will appear 
more clearly below. It is thanks to eugenics, he argued approvingly, that the focus of 
demographic studies —and social sciences in general, we may add—could shift from 
mere  quantity to  quality of population. Current eugenics, especially in its extreme 
hereditary versions as epitomized by Davenport’s work, was to be criticized for its 
unsatisfactory scientifi c content, and not for its philosophical premises; i.e., the hierar-
chical ontology of human nature it implied. 
 Apart from these scattered and fragmentary remarks, Wolfe’s skepticism towards 
extreme eugenic views found its most complete and articulate expression in his own 
analysis of the psychological basis of social attitudes. Starting from the early 1920s, in 
fact, Wolfe authored a series of essays on social psychology (1919, 1921b, 1922a, 
1923a, 1923b) that culminated in his  Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientifi c Method 
(1923c). There, he discussed major methodological issues of relevance for institution-
alism and the social sciences in general, and proposed his own views on the nature of 
social confl ict and the dynamics of institutional evolution. It is to these aspects, and 
their eugenicist implications, that we now turn our attention. 
 III.  WOLFE’S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 In order to assess systematically Wolfe’s social psychology, a few preliminary consider-
ations about his epistemological commitments become necessary. As already mentioned, 
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Wolfe belonged to the scientistic wing of institutionalism, together with people such 
as Wesley C. Mitchell, Morris Copeland, Rexford G. Tugwell, and Lawrence K. Frank, 
to name just a few. This current within the movement emphasized the scientifi c content 
of institutionalism as opposed to the metaphysical and pre-scientifi c character of 
received theory. In particular, as I have argued elsewhere (Fiorito  2009 ), it identifi ed 
“science” with three main positivistic tenets: (1) empiricism in the extreme form of 
either phenomenalism or physicalism (i.e., the reduction of science to statements about 
directly observable facts); (2) naturalistic methodological monism (i.e., the view that 
social sciences have basically the same aims and methods as their natural counterparts); 
and (3) the emphasis on the social value of science and its practical applications to the 
problem of “social control.”  7  
 An important corollary of this general view was the adoption of behaviorism as the 
“scientifi c” psychological basis for social research. With its emphasis on demarcating 
science (observed behavior) from metaphysics (mental states), behaviorism could claim 
to establish a fi rm scientifi c link between the agent’s objective situation (the condition, 
or conditioning) and the empirical observation of the corresponding behavior. Rather 
than concern itself with intentionality and introspection, behaviorists insisted, 
psychology should focus on aspects of behavior such as the stimulus-and-response 
sequence, habit formation, and habit integration. Psychological knowledge would then 
facilitate the prediction of behavior. As John B. Watson (1913, p. 167) put it, “In a system 
of psychology completely worked out, given the response the stimuli can be predicted; 
given the stimuli the response can be predicted.” In this connection, Wolfe’s enthusi-
asm for behaviorism was unequivocal. In his opinion, “[t]he lack of a mechanistic 
psychology, free from a priori philosophical and metaphysical presuppositions, based 
upon prolonged and disciplined observation and inductive analysis of human behavior …, 
has probably been the chief obstacle to the development of an objective treatment of 
human affairs.” Such a “mechanistic” psychology, Wolfe optimistically continued, is 
now in the process of rapid development:
 Its methods and postulates aim to be scientifi c in the fundamental sense. It regards the 
human individual as a mechanism, and the key to its understanding an objective 
analysis of the mechanism of stimulus and response, from the simplest to the most 
complex aspects of the process. In a word, behavioristic or mechanistic psychology 
seeks the verifi able causes (sequences) of human activity. It aims to discover the facts 
as to the mechanism of human personality and the causation of the individual temper-
aments and attitudes. (Wolfe 1923c, p. 218) 
 Wolfe acknowledges the importance of an understanding of human purposes and 
motives for all the social sciences: “[h]uman life is also shot through and through with 
the purposes of human individuals.… Consequently the social scientist cannot dodge, 
if he would, the necessity of including motives in his factual data.” In another passage, 
he insists: “[t]here is scarcely a department of social science, economics, jurispru-
dence, social psychology or what not, in which investigations of social organization 
and social process does not involve, or at any rate ought not to involve, a study of 
 
7
 In his proposals for an objective, scientifi c approach to the study of human behavior, which drew upon the 
methods of the natural sciences, however, Wolfe was far more cautious than people such as Morris 
Copeland or Lawrence K. Frank. See Wolfe (1922a, 1923b). 
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motives.” But, he immediately adds in typical behavioristic jargon, “motives are to be 
regarded as links in the stream or nexus of the general mechanistic causation of social 
phenomena” (1923c, p. 234); “purposes are but a part of the mechanism” (1923c, 
p. 242). For the behaviorist, the notion of teleological behavior must be expunged from 
the dominium of scientifi c inquiry. Motives and desires are unobservable, and should 
be reinterpreted in terms of general empirical laws based on systematic observation of 
the correspondence between stimulus and response. Accordingly, Wolfe defi ned a 
desire as “the result of stimulus, and the stimulus always leads to some sort of bodily 
or psycho-physical activity.” Any stimulus, he explained, “produces a disequilibrium, 
which is normally balanced by the appropriate reaction or response” (1921b, p. 282). 
It should be emphasized, however, that Wolfe’s own version of behaviorism was not 
completely coherent from a methodological point of view. Differently from orthodox 
behaviorists à la Watson, in fact, Wolfe did not completely reject consciousness, and 
retained a vital role for instincts, mostly interpreted as hereditary stimulus-reaction 
patterns and proclivities. This led Harvard’s social psychologist William McDougall to 
argue that what Wolfe means by ‘behaviorism’ “is merely the balanced psychology 
which does not, like so much of the intellectualistic psychology of the last century, 
concern itself exclusively with facts and problems of consciousness, to the almost total 
neglect of the facts of conduct. But to call such psychology ‘behaviorism’ is merely to 
confuse the reader, at the small gain of seeming to be in-step with a current fashion” 
(McDougall  1924 , pp. 717–718; see also Dickinson  1924 ). 
 Coherently with his “behavioristic” creed, Wolfe proposed an explanation of social 
attitudes based on the interaction between the individual and his/her environment. For 
example, he argued that radicalism arises through the blocking of some (behavioristi-
cally conceived) desire, and shows itself in an attempt to change the environment. In 
Wolfe’s own words:
 The normal, healthy conservative lives a life of short-cycle routine (largely habitual) 
in which organic disequilibria, physical or mental, are balanced, and the energy of desire 
or unrest released in a fairly regular rhythm. In individuals who become radicals, this 
short-cycle ebb and fl ow of disequilibrium and equilibrium, of desire and satisfaction, 
of stimulus and releasing reaction, is broken into by desires or interests which do not 
fi nd release or expression in normal rhythmic response.  A state of more or less chronic 
unrest ensues, and may become the basis for defi nitely formulated desire for funda-
mental change in the environment. (Wolfe 1921b, p. 281; emphasis added) 
 When an individual is confronted with the necessity of readjusting himself to his 
environment, he may either modify his desires and accept the situation or he may make 
an attack upon the environment. Readjustment may take place through one of three 
processes: (1) repression, which is not likely to produce radical attitudes; (2) transfer-
ence and substitution; the individual may engage in some radical movement that sym-
bolically represents the repressed desire; (3) reinforcement, through attention to the 
obstacles. This latter is the center of radical motivation, and it gives the drive and 
the consistency to radical movements. It should be noted also that, for Wolfe, there are 
positive instincts (i.e., inborn reaction patterns) that motivate innovators. 
 An exhaustive treatment of the psychological basis of Wolfe’s analysis of social 
attitudes would go well beyond the limits of this paper. What is signifi cant to the pre-
sent discussion is the fact that in adopting an explicit behavioristic perspective, Wolfe 
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clearly reaffi rmed his distance from the extreme eugenicists’ views of human nature. 
Wolfe made clear his position in a paper—emblematically entitled “Eugenics and 
Social Attitudes”—read before the second international congress of eugenics in New 
York. “Contrary to the general trend of sentiment among orthodox eugenicists”—he 
affi rmed in 1921—“I venture to think that the main cause of our failure to make the 
great Society safe for human life, freedom, and happiness, lies not in defi cient mental 
capacity but in a lack of will and of the right attitudes” (1923d, p. 414). Wolfe then 
went on to elaborate to its full extent the criticism of eugenics he had already advanced 
in his earlier reviews. I cannot forbear quoting his paper at some length:
 [I]t appears to me that the main attention of eugenicists—of all but the most highly 
specialized genetic investigators—should now be directed primarily to the environ-
mental causes of these obstructive social attitudes, and to the cultural means of their 
elimination. Such a shifting of attention and effort will by no means be contrary to the 
broader spirit of eugenics as conceived by its founder. For we need to keep in mind 
that Francis Galton [1904, p. 1] defi ned eugenics not only “as the science that deals 
with all infl uences that improve the inborn qualities of the race” but “also with those 
that develop them to the utmost advantage.” Insomuch as Galton’s work, and the work 
of most of the men who took their inspiration from his leadership, fell victim to the 
period when biology was going through its most striking development and when it 
was having a most profound infl uence on sociological theory and social ideals, it is 
not strange that Galton and his followers lost sight of the second half of his defi nition 
and that some contemporary scholars like [Karl] Pearson in England and Davenport in 
America have practically denied signifi cance to environmental infl uence and ontoge-
netic development. Today, however, with the advances continually being made in 
behavioristic psychology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis, we should be more 
than unscientifi c did we not turn attention back to the neglected half of the defi nition 
and of the task of eugenics in this broader sense. (Wolfe 1923d, p. 416) 
 In reviewing the fallacies of eugenics, Wolfe contested the identifi cation between 
the economic elite and the biological elite. Economic superiority cannot, in any case, 
be assumed to be the refl ection of psychophysics superiority. “Paradoxically,” Wolfe 
maintained, “the real dysgenic element of our population today … is to be found in 
strongest force not in the classes where it is usually assumed to lie, but in the well-to-do, 
middle classes.” It is among these higher strata of society
 that we fi nd the unquestioning acceptance of archaic philosophies and a hypertrophy of 
the unsocial instincts of acquisitions and combat and of class consciousness. Here, more 
than anywhere else, the individualistic social selection has put a premium on commercial 
“success,” upon inability or unwillingness too closely to distinguish between production 
and predation, and upon warship at the golden sign of the dollar. (Wolfe 1923d, p. 417)  8  
 
8
 Wolfe failed to mention that many eugenicists rejected easy correlations between hereditary fi tness and an 
hereditary aristocracy at the top of the social ladder. Charles Darwin himself had warned of the evil conse-
quences of primogeniture’s perpetuating the mental and physical weaknesses of elder sons while superior 
younger progeny were often unable to marry. In a similar vein, Galton argued that younger sons were 
usually more intelligent and successful than their eldest brothers, a contention he thought to be empirically 
reinforced by his biometric studies. See Solaway (1995, pp. 73–75) for a reconstruction of the debate on 
primogeniture and eugenics. 
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 Such a perpetuation of “archaic” attitudes, he concluded, is not imputable to any 
“defi ciency in native mental capacity.” Rather, it is the consequence of the fact that, in 
these higher classes, “the whole weight of antiquated conventions, ideals, attitudes, 
and institutions is thrown with least relief and counteraction upon relatively defense-
less youth” (Wolfe 1923d, p. 417). The Veblenian fl avor of this whole line of reasoning 
is easily identifi able. Not surprisingly, in his writings, Wolfe repeatedly referred to 
Veblen’s works, especially to the  Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial 
Arts (1914). Signifi cantly, in his later recollection, Wolfe himself acknowledged the 
infl uence of Veblen during his formative years: “[i]n all my student days at Harvard, 
I never heard of Walras or Pareto, or of a concept called ‘general equilibrium’…. 
Institutionalism, in the shape of Veblen’s fi rst two books, was only a wisp on the horizon, 
not an ominous cloud” (Wolfe  1946 , p. 848).  9  
 IV.  TOWARDS A SCIENTIFIC ETHICS 
 Moving from these metdological premises, Wolfe developed a whole analysis of the 
nature and causes of social confl ict. Here, the pervading infl uence of Veblen becomes 
even more manifest. John Dewey’s instrumentalism was pointed out as another infl u-
ential source of inspiration (Young  1925 , p. 160). The central thesis of Wolfe’s social 
philosophy is that the principal source of progress in man’s estate has been science and 
its fruits, while the main source of contemporary social problems is the failure of the 
habits and institutions that most directly determine social attitudes to develop as rapidly 
as those that guide scientifi c inquiry. According to Wolfe, it is primarily by means of 
intelligence, manifested and applied in scientifi c inquiry, that men have gained control 
over nature. As a consequence, he continued (1923c, pp. 276–277),
 unless there is some scientifi c reason for supposing that man is not part of nature, and 
is therefore exempt from its laws, the scientifi c method of investigating and ordering 
human relations may be expected, when really applied, to yield results far preferable 
to those produced by the motor-habituations, the superstitious sentimentalism, the 
dogmatic loyalties, and the weddedness to rationalized illusions which have thus far 
been man’s chief guides to social organization and social process. 
 Unfortunately, however, antiquated habits of thinking and acting with respect to 
economic, social, political, and moral matters stand in the way of such an application 
of the “scientifi c method” to the organization of society. These habits originated long 
before the “scientifi c age,” yet they continue most directly to determine the nature of 
the social and economic arrangements under which men live. “We are the victims,” 
Wolfe (1923c, p. 301) pointed out, “of a social inheritance from the individualistic 
political and economic philosophy of the eighteenth century, a philosophy which is 
still used, great as have been the modifi cations, with popular, apologetic effect by 
those who oppose the development of a new and more social-minded liberalism.” 
In turn, these antiquated habits of thoughts are fostered by institutions with vested 
 
9
 At the University of Texas, Wolfe was a colleague of Max Handman, who had been close to Veblen at 
Missouri. 
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interests. These institutions embody pre-scientifi c views of man and his place in nature 
and society. At the root of their dogmas are metaphysical doctrines based on ideas of 
the individual as social atom, changeless absolutes, fi xed essences, and fi nal causes. As 
examples, Wolfe referred to the “linear reasoning” bias—“the besetting sin of ‘one-track’ 
minds”—that contaminates much of received social thought, “from the economic 
man and Ricardo’s theory of value to the frictionless static state and Clark’s specifi c 
productivity.” In this connection, eugenic thought makes no exception:
 Eugenics literature is shot through and through with linear reasoning. Less than 
formerly, but still, to all intents and purposes, the eugenicists, like their precursors the 
selectionists, are so keen to trace out the infl uence of heredity that they constantly take 
for heredity much that non-linear observation would show to be due to ontogenetic 
variation under environmental infl uences. If human life is ever reduced to a mathemat-
ical equation it is safe to say it will not a simple linear equation. Causation does not 
work in lines. (1923c, p. 249) 
 It is, thus, in this contradiction between the backward social and moral habits and 
the progressive science and technology that is to be found the underlying cause of the 
present social unrest and of the “moral confusion” that fuels contemporary social con-
fl ict. Wolfe’s reconstructive program is suggested by his very characterization of the 
problem as the lag of habits and institutions directly affecting social attitudes behind 
the habits that guide scientifi c inquiry.  10  The former must become scientifi c. Men must 
learn to shape and control their social and moral habits by “the method of science.” 
They have to develop an authentic scientifi c attitude based on the assumptions that 
“human life, like the rest of nature, is completely and dependably mechanistic” (1923c, 
p. 242). 
 We have already discussed Wolfe’s conception of science in the previous section. 
The relevant aspect here is that the application of science to social organization not 
only involves the behavioristic study of human conduct, but also leads directly to the 
problem of social ethics. As he (Wolfe  1924a , p. 479) put it in his contribution to 
Tugwell’s  Trend of Economics : “[i]f behavioristic psychology … shall prove capable 
of giving us a really scientifi c analysis and understanding of human nature, as 
I believe it will, it should point the way to a fundamental, objectively scientifi c, eth-
ical norm, or ultimate end of life.” Further, ethics, like economics, is “also funda-
mentally a science of means and ends” (1924a, p. 477), and a truly scientifi c ethics 
must be based on the assumption that the  means of living are social while the  ends 
are strictly individual. “An ethics grounded in a hard-headed objective psychology,” 
Wolfe explained, “will have to regard the individual as the only possible end.” 
Whenever “some metaphysical absolute (like God or the ‘race’) or some fi gurative 
thing like ‘social’ welfare is set up as an end, ethics gets into logical diffi culties with 
the known facts of motivation and breaks company with scientifi c psychology” 
(1923c, p. 253). 
 
10
 Wolfe’s emphasis on the progressive role of science and technology, as opposed to the conservative iner-
tia exercised by habits and institutions, may appear as an important step toward an Ayresian dichotomous 
conception of institutional evolution. In spite of some undeniable parallels between the two men’s social 
philosophies, Wolfe (1944) wrote a particularly critical review of Ayres’  Theory of Economic Progress 
(1944). 
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 Wolfe’s notion of scientifi c ethics is based on the assumption that the individual 
acts in obedience to the strongest impulse or combination of impulses, and that “the 
strongest urge is, if conscious, the one obedience we believe or feel will give us the 
greatest happiness or the least unhappiness under the circumstances” (1923c, p. 257). 
In spite of this apparently utilitarian jargon, Wolfe developed his argument in non-
strictly hedonistic terms.  11  First, he defi ned happiness as “that psycho-physical state or 
tone which results from, and accompanies, the full, free, and healthy functioning 
of the individual powers and capacities, to whatever extent and intensity and in 
whatsoever directions do not interfere with a like functioning of the powers of 
other individuals” (Wolfe 1923c, p. 258; see also Wolfe  1919 , 1923a). Then, he 
argued that the total amount of individual happiness depends on the amount of 
possibilities for self-realization he enjoys and to the extent he contributes to the 
creation of these opportunities for other individuals. While, in fact, the “narrow 
egotist” pursues his own happiness “as he himself were the only end,” the “broader 
egotist” may, because of his sympathetic attitudes, “suffer all the miseries he sees 
others suffer, but he also vicariously enjoys the happiness of others,” and, by sharing 
their experiences, he “may live an infi nitely larger life than the narrow egotist ever 
has the capacity to conceive” (Wolfe 1923c, pp. 258–259).  12  This allows Wolfe to 
distance himself from a purely individualistic conception of human nature. The indi-
vidual, he wrote,
 may be regarded as a sort of dynamo, in which enter a multitude of lines of social 
infl uence, which are there transformed into currents of energy and personality 
that, then, fl ow out from him to the external world. The amount and character of 
his self-expression and happiness depend on two things, (1) the amount and kind 
of energy of which he is the locus, and (2) the outlets for this energy as trans-
formed and re-co-ordinated by his personality. The fi rst we may summarize under 
the term  opportunity , the second under  service. (Wolfe 1923c, p. 261; emphasis in 
original) 
 Wolfe’s fi nal step was to discuss the most effi cient allocation of these socially created 
opportunities for happiness among individuals. We have just seen that he considered 
every individual, because of his power of conscious self-expression, not only an 
 end , but also a  means , since he can maximize his happiness only to the extent he 
contributes to the collective creation of opportunities for every individual. But, Wolfe 
warned, “neither as ends and means are individuals of equal worth and importance” 
 
11
 Wolfe himself recognized that “the term happiness has acquired such a coating of ‘grossly hedonistic’ 
connotation, and is so indefi nite in its popular meaning, that it would be desirable to substitute another term 
if we would fi nd one. Yet, I am content to keep it, because I believe it possible to give it some approxima-
tion to the essential scientifi c defi niteness” (1924a, pp. 480–481). 
 
12
 Wolfe follows Adam Smith in considering sympathy not as mere altruism—“there is no such thing, in the 
last analysis, as altruism” (1923a, p. 400)—but as a working cause, just as self-interest, that contributes to 
the fi nal goal of individual happiness: “So social is the nature of man … so much is our life widened by 
sympathy, and so happy a fi eld for the satisfaction of gregariousness and workmanship do mutual aid and 
‘altruistic’ co-operation afford, that my life should be broadened, my self-expression multiplied, and my 
happiness increased in the proportion that I not only refuse to live at your expense (equally refusing 
to let you live at mine) but equally in the proportion that I co-operate with you to widen your sphere of 
self-expression and to increase your happiness” (1923c, p. 259). 
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(1923c, pp. 264–265). Individuals differ both in their capacity for self-expression 
and in their ability to provide service for the production of opportunities: “They differ 
actually, not only because their organic inheritances are diverse, but because the oppor-
tunities for development which they have had have been different. They differ poten-
tially, ‘naturally,’ to the extent that their hereditary endowment differ” (1923c, p. 265).  13  
In spite of such explicit recognition of differences in the inborn capacities of individ-
uals, however, Wolfe did not miss the chance to reiterate his criticism of eugenics. 
Wolfe believed that the position held by Pearson, Davenport, and his fellow extremists 
focused too much on innate limitations. Instead of viewing human beings as the 
sole product of their heredity, Wolfe argued, a truly scientifi c ethics should grant 
initial equal opportunities to every individual and also take into account the devel-
opment that could exist despite heredity. Heredity, according to this view, provides 
a foundation to be assessed, rather than an insurmountable limit unscientifi cally 
set upon individuals:
 While no reasonably informed person to-day would attempt to defend the thesis that 
all individuals are equal by hereditary endowment, there has been on the other hand 
an immense output of unwarranted conclusions as to natural inequality and the 
scarcity of hereditary capacity, drawn from investigations which have purported to 
isolate and measure hereditary capacity (mental as well as physical). In most cases 
such investigation can be shown to be grossly oblivious of the presence of probable 
environmental infl uences in the creation of talents or defects which has been taken 
as hereditary. Whatever may be the truth about natural inheritances—whether we 
are as different in natural endowments as eugenicists like Pearson and Davenport 
would have us to believe, or are more nearly equal than any one now believes we 
are, this much should be clear:  we cannot on scientifi c ground condemn an indi-
vidual to inferior status and deprive him of opportunity before he has been tried out 
for a time under opportunities equal to those granted others. (1923c, p. 265; emphasis 
added) 
 Human characteristics are far too complicated to control through simplistically 
conceived biological principles for breeding, and, even more importantly, human 
beings provide a special case in which environment plays an essential role in the 
fi nal product. Since environment had its greatest effect during the formative years 
of the development of any organism, Wolfe argued, “[a]ll individuals would have 
to be given as nearly equal environmental stimulus (education, etc.) as possible, 
clear through the formative years of childhood and adolescence.” At the conclu-
sion of such a period, “the psychological testers could be called in, vocational experts 
 
13
 By admitting differences in the inborn endowment of the individual’s capacities, Wolfe further distanced 
himself from a strictly Watsonian brand of behaviorism. Watson, in fact, maintained that environmental 
stimuli were the sole cause of differences in human behavior and explained that “nurture—not nature” was 
thus responsible “for what the child becomes.” “Give me a dozen healthy infants”—as he baldly affi rmed 
in his celebrated  Behaviorism (1925, p. 82) —“and I’ll guarantee to take anyone at random and train him 
to become any kind of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even 
beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his 
ancestors.” 
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summoned for advice, and the sheep defi nitely separated from the goats” (1923c, 
p. 274).  14  
 All this led Wolfe to formulate the four propositions defi ning a democratic organi-
zation of society based on a scientifi c ethics. These propositions are:
 (1) individuals and only individuals are ends; (2) individuals differ in potential natural 
capacity and hence are not all ends of equal magnitude; (3) economy of limited resources 
therefore demands that opportunity be distributed to individuals  pro rata fi rst to their 
potential, and later to their developed capacities; (4) effi cient production and economical 
distribution of opportunity cannot be obtained by any  laissez faire system of individ-
ualistic acquisition, they can be obtained only by intelligently planned, rationally 
co-ordinated, social co-operation. (1923c, pp. 272–273) 
 V.  WOLFE’S CRITICISM OF RAYMOND PEARL’S “LOGISTIC CURVE” 
 A few fi nal words should be devoted to Wolfe’s contributions to population studies. 
What concerns us here is Wolfe’s criticism of the law of population growth and density 
that Johns Hopkins biologist Raymond Pearl, along with Lowell J. Reed, had intro-
duced in a series of papers published during the early 1920s (Pearl and Reed  1920 , 
1923, 1924).  15  In these works, Pearl and Reed argued that human population growth 
over time appears as an S-shaped curve that they called the “logistic curve.”  16  The 
shape of the curve refl ected the “long-run tendency of any population whose growth 
rate, beginning at zero, rose slowly until the midpoint of a cycle, where the curve 
increased at diminishing rate until the cycle was completed at a point of population 
saturation” (Ramsden  2002 , p. 866). This discovery was vital to human (and non-human) 
demographics because it provided a simple graphical and mathematical principle to 
the idea that population growth is self-limiting and that population will cease to grow 
on reaching its “carrying capacity”; i.e., the population size that can be supported by 
the environment. Pearl and Reed’s analysis was based, among other things, on the 
assumption that, given a limited area into which the population could expand, the rate of 
increase at any time was proportional to two things: the magnitude of the population at 
that time, and the “still unutilized potentialities of support existing in the limited area” 
 
14
 Wolfe considered education as the crucial part of that individual process of adjustment to the environ-
ment “which may be called ontogenetic adaptation” (1923c, p. 45). This raises the question whether Wolfe 
was also reasoning along Neo-Lamarckian lines in which acquired characteristics could be transmitted 
from parents to their offspring. Unfortunately, Wolfe is rather elusive on this point, and does not provide 
an exhaustive discussion of his own views on heredity. In one crucial passage, however, he seems to lean 
implicitly toward Neo-Lamarckism. Wolfe quotes with approval Veblen’s contention that whenever an 
habitual line of action “is enforced upon the group or the race by a selective elimination of those individ-
uals and lines of descent that do not conform to the required canon of knowledge and conduct …,  the 
acquired proclivity passes from the status of habit to that of aptitude or propensity. It becomes a transmissible 
trait …” (Veblen  1898 , p. 195; quoted in Wolfe 1923c, p. 44; emphasis added). 
 
15
 Reed, a mathematician, supplied the statistical analyses behind these papers, but the topic itself and the 
conclusions drawn from them more properly belonged to Pearl (Kingsland  1995 , p. 64). 
 
16
 The name “logistic” explicitly recalled the work of the Belgian Pierre-François Verhulst, who, more than 
eighty years earlier, had described population growth in a similar way, and in 1845 had called his curve of 
growth “logistique” (Kingsland  1982 ). 
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(Pearl and Reed  1920 , p. 281). In this case, “unutilized potentialities” could best be under-
stood as simply the normalized difference between the existing and the limiting population. 
In Pearl’s later writings (1924, 1925), this statement became equivalent to the assumption 
that the growth of a population decreases in linear fashion with the density of population. 
 According to Pearl and Reed, the logistic curve was not only a predictive model for 
population growth but also a “universal mathematical law” for most forms of biological 
growth (Kingsland  1982 ,  1995 ; Ramsden  2002 ).  17  This led Pearl to hold a relatively 
deterministic position about the biological attributes of the logistic curve. As he made 
it clear in his  The Biology of Population , the curve demonstrated that “plainly all 
growth, including that of population, is fundamentally a biological matter” (Pearl  1925 , 
p. 3). Consequently, environmental factors—broadly conceived—might cause minor 
fl uctuations in the logistic curve but would not cause it to deviate substantially from its 
shape of a logarithmic parabola. “In the face of the considerable evidence now at hand, 
which could be still further multiplied,” Pearl explained, “it is irresistibly borne in upon 
one that all the complexities of human behaviour, social organization, economic struc-
ture, and political activity, seem to alter much less than would have been expected the 
results of the operation of these biological forces which basically determine the course 
of the growth of populations of men, as well as those of yeast cells” (Pearl  1925 , p. 18). 
 Pearl’s position on the biological determinants of the logistic curve as a “population 
law” fueled much criticism from those scholars, the majority numbered among the 
social sciences, who believed that social factors were the primary infl uences on popu-
lation growth. “For social scientists”—notes Edmund Ramsden (2002, p. 860)—“Pearl’s 
logistic curve represented all that was wrong with the biologist’s attempt to study 
population dynamics, and moreover, epitomized the threat of biological imperialism 
and determinism to social science and social reform.” Wolfe ( 1925 ,  1927a ,  1927b , 
 1929 ) took an active part in this reaction. Wolfe acknowledged that no contribution to 
the theory of population in the last decades had attracted the attention that Pearl’s 
logistic formula had received since its appearance. The reasons for such popularity 
were to be found in Pearl’s scientifi c fame as a biometrician, in the post-war revival of 
interest among biologists in demographic problems, and in the fact that the new “law” 
of population growth seemed to liberate the world from the old Malthusian threat of 
overpopulation. As importantly, the logistic curve appeared to be in line with the 
contemporary “scientifi c fashion”; that is, “the extraordinary postwar development of 
mathematical statistics and the attempt to apply statistical methods to all sorts of prob-
lems, not always with adequate attention to the question whether they are amenable to 
valid methods of statistical analysis” (Wolfe  1928b , p. 679). 
 Wolfe went on attacking both the technical features of Pearl’s population-growth 
theory—such as the curve-fi tting procedure employed and statistical signifi cance of 
the coeffi cient of correlation between birthrate and density—and the more general 
epistemological foundations of his approach. The latter aspects are those relevant to 
the present discussion. In order to make his point, Wolfe quoted a passage from Pearl 
stating that the use of the logistic curve as a long-term forecasting tool depended on 
the assumption that “the conditions which led to the law according to which that par-
ticular growth has occurred in the known past will continue to operate” (Pearl  1924 , 
 
17
 The word “law” appears a dozen times in Pearl and Reed’s  1920 paper; at one time they suggest that their 
fi tted curve captures the “true law of population growth” (Pearl and Reed  1920 , p. 286). 
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pp. 566–567; quoted in Wolfe  1927b , p. 574). Wolfe (1927b, p. 576) accused Pearl of 
not taking his methodological caveat seriously enough: “one could be tempted by the 
inference that Pearl is driven by the fi ne frenzy of pure intellectual play, did he not 
in his later writings broadly hint that he feels himself to be on the trail of a great 
discovery—a ‘rational,’ ‘mathematico-biological’ law of population growth, universally 
valid.” For Wolfe, Pearl’s inconsistency was due to the impossibility to state such a  ceteris 
paribus clause with respect to population growth, where many external factors—social, 
economic, political, and religious—can come into play in an unpredictable fash-
ion. No simplistically conceived mechanical formula could, therefore, capture the 
complexities of the stimulus-response patterns determining human behavior (including 
breeding). Consistently with his methodological premises, Wolfe phrased once again 
his recurrent argument in behavioristic terms:
 Human behavior, however, while it is doubtless electrochemical in ultimate mecha-
nistic analysis, is not so direct and simple. Human actions and attitudes are no doubt 
conditioned by the physical state of the individual, but they are also resultants of very 
complex stimuli from the environment, physical, economic, political, and socio-
psychological. The problem of population growth is therefore more directly and signifi -
cantly a problem of social psychology than one of bio-chemistry. Such considerations are 
all too frequently overlooked by biologists, Pearl included. The higher the organism, 
the greater the complexity of its structure and functions and the more variable its stimulus-
response relation to its environment. The higher the organism, also, the more complex 
is the environment to which it responds. In the case of human beings, at least those above 
the lowest cultural level, there are many practically unmeasurable and unpredictable 
variables which infl uence vital phenomena—marriage, birth, death, and migration—
and thence the rate of growth of population. (Wolfe  1927b , p. 584) 
 There is something ironical here. At the same time Wolfe was criticizing Pearl’s 
population-growth theory, using substantially the same line of argument he had adopted 
to condemn eugenicists such as Davenport and Pearson, Pearl was waging his own 
famous attack on eugenics. Exactly in 1927, in fact, Pearl published his landmark essay 
“The Biology of Superiority,” where he argued that eugenics had “recently fallen in 
some degree into disrepute,” due to the “ill-advised zeal” of “devotees” who explained 
“poverty, insanity, crime, prostitution, cancer, etc.” with a simple and utterly hypothetical 
Mendelian mechanism. These contributions have reduced eugenics to a “mingled mess 
of ill-grounded and uncritical sociology, economics, anthropology, and politics, full 
of emotional appeals to class and race prejudices, solemnly put forth as science, and 
unfortunately accepted as such by the general public” (Pearl  1927 , p. 260).  18  
 
18
 Pearl pointed out that several recent discoveries in the fi eld of genetics had severely challenged Galton’s 
eugenic notion of “ancestral heredity.” Drawing upon Edward M. East’s and Donald F. Jones’ inbreeding 
and outbreeding experiments (1919), Pearl argued that continuous inbreeding of organisms from generation 
to generation leads ordinarily to decline of vigor, increase of death rate, sterility, and even sometimes 
deformity. Inbred lines, however, could be reinvigorated by breeding them with organisms from other 
hereditary lines. Thus, close interbreeding—the animal counterpart of the eugenicists “racial purity”—was 
shown to be genetically deleterious. Though a member of the Galton society, the eugenics movement’s 
inner circle founded by Davenport, Pearl became dismayed with much of eugenicist doctrines by the early 
1920s. See Mezzano ( 2005 ), and Little and Garruto ( 2010 ). 
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 Still in this connection, there is a further aspect that should be taken into consider-
ation. Although Wolfe had criticized Pearl’s biological determinism on the basis that 
human intervention was capable of interfering with the laws of nature, he did retain 
some explicit form of biological orientation in his assessment of population shifts. 
In the eyes of Wolfe, in fact, Pearl’s analysis was guilty of focusing exclusively on the 
quantitative aspects of population growth, neglecting the qualitative side of the process. 
As he put it:
 Pearl, and his disciple, [James S.] Sweeney, regard the vital index—or we may say 
more simply the rate of natural increase—as a measure of the “biological soundness” 
of a population. All that this means is that the population which is autogenously 
increasing shows its ability to increase. The converse is not true, of course. A popula-
tion that is decreasing is not necessarily biologically or in any other way “unsound.” 
 It seems unfortunate to use the term “biological soundness” in this connection, for a 
population which is increasing may nevertheless be composed of individuals of low 
physical health and vitality and of low mentality. Surely “biological soundness,” 
if it means anything, means more than mere spawning capacity. (Wolfe  1929 , p. 103; 
quoted in Ramsden  2002 , p. 870; emphasis added)  19  
 For Wolfe, Pearl’s logistic formula refl ected the unfortunate consequences that result 
when biologists, with no background in economic and sociological theory, face broader 
sociological issues. Signifi cantly, Wolfe concluded in 1927, it is this neglect of envi-
ronmental factors—as epitomized by Pearl’s contribution—that have hampered the 
development of eugenics as a science:
 The biologists themselves, by their persistent refusal or inability to recognize the 
profound bearing of the psychology of the learning process and the signifi cance of 
differential opportunity, have done much to retard the progress of eugenics as a 
science, and to turn many against it as an art. If now they are to turn their attention to 
the problem of the quantity of population and propose “scientifi c” solutions on lines 
of analogy, and mathematical statistics which take no account of the signifi cant 
factors peculiar to human culture, we may perhaps well wish that the slight debt which 
biology owes to economics, through Darwin’s chance reading of Malthus, may be allowed 
to run. Population theory is not likely to be benefi ted by such repayment. (Wolfe  1927b , 
pp. 593–594; quoted in Ramsden  2002 , p. 884) 
 VI.  FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 In this paper, we have portrayed Wolfe as an institutionalist with progressive roots. 
This twofold (and somehow confl icting) nature of Wolfe’s social thought is refl ected 
 
19
 In spite of these reservations, Wolfe relied on Pearl’s prediction of population growth in order to demon-
strate the compelling need of effi cient birth-control policies in post-war America: “In a remarkable series 
of papers, Professor Raymond Pearl of Johns Hopkins University, has shown by mathematical and statis-
tical analysis that the upper limit of population in the United States, at anything like our present standard 
of living is below 200,000,000. At the present rate of growth we shall reach that point in a few decades…. 
It would seem … that Birth Control is a matter to which the Disarmament Conference might with benefi t 
to the future prospects of civilization, devote some slight attention” (Wolfe 1922b, pp. 28–29). 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT466
in his criticism of extreme eugenic views. From progressivism, Wolfe took the hierar-
chical view of human nature, according to which individuals differ in their inborn 
endowments of capacities. Although human evolution is a process that involves both 
phylogenic and ontogenic adaptation, the latter appears to be impossible or incom-
plete in those individuals who lack the proper phylogenic traits. “[T]he hereditary 
feeble-minded”—he sentenced—“are phylogenetically unfi t for successful individual 
adjustment to the demands of life in modern society” (1923c, p. 43). Moving from 
these premises, Wolfe looked with favor at eugenics as a scientifi c effort to take into 
adequate consideration the qualitative characteristics of the social aggregate in the 
analysis of population dynamics. Wolfe phrased his eugenic arguments in non-racial 
terms, and emphasized the effi ciency side of the problem. Since human capacities are 
scarce and unequally distributed, their allocation, he argued, “is a matter of economy 
as well as of ethics—if indeed the two be not synonymous. Opportunity should be put 
where it will do the most good” (1923c, p. 408). In this connection, Wolfe’s endorsement 
of minimum-wage legislation and his condemnation of the unemployables should be 
seen as an attempt to allocate effi ciently opportunities among individuals equipped with 
different inherited characteristics.  20  
 At the same time, inspired by Dewey and Veblen, Wolfe held that the methods of 
science could be successfully used to refi x habits of belief and action and to reform 
institutions in ways that will contribute to social effi ciency. Accordingly, like many of 
his fellow institutionalists, Wolfe embraced the emerging behaviorist creed, and argued 
that many eugenic claims were not adequately informed about the role of environmen-
tal agencies in causing disease and disability. “There is much that goes for hereditary 
feeble-mindedness,” he wrote, “which is due to malnutrition and adenoids” (1923c, 
pp. 265–266). Although Wolfe did not deny the role of physical and mental inheritance 
in determining the quality of individuals, he also believed that environment comple-
mented heredity in efforts to advance the human population on the path of social pro-
gress. Education, in particular, could move human beings forward in their social and 
intellectual capabilities. Experience had proven that education could provide advance-
ment in individual ability, while relying exclusively upon heredity neither had a fi rm 
scientifi c foundation, nor afforded reliable methods to predict exact inheritance and 
development. As Wolfe himself put it, in the closing passages of his  Conservatism, 
Radicalism, and Scientifi c Method :
 It is not our hope that the undesirable sentiments of conservatism, radicalism, and 
popular-mindedness can be eliminated over night; that a near approach to, and diffu-
sion of, the scientifi c attitude is soon to be looked for.  But insofar as we secure the 
needed attitudinal modifi cation at all, it will not be through segregating a few feeble-
minded or exhorting the well-to-do to have larger families. It will come through functional, 
courageous, progressive education . (1923c, p. 333; emphasis added) 
 
20
 It should be noted that Wolfe was well aware of the welfare implication of an endorsement of minimum-
wage legislation and the consequent exclusion of the unemployables from the labor force. “The real ques-
tion,” he wrote, “is whether the ineffi cient are less burden if we permit them to be employed at low wages 
and thus tend to fi x the wages of the normal workers at the same low level, or whether they would be less 
burden if we defi nitely prohibit the employment in industry of any person who can not earn a standard 
wage, and set such persons aside for special treatment, much as we do backward children and subnormals 
in the schools” (Wolfe  1917 , p. 278). 
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